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Abstract
This paper provides a simple framework to study the effect of disagreement on a multi-
asset market equilibrium by considering two agents who disagree about expected re-
turns, variances and correlation of returns of two risky assets. When agents’ subjective
beliefs are characterized by mean preserving spreads of a benchmark homogeneous
belief, we show that the effect of the disagreement does not cancel out in general and
the effect in a multi-asset market can be very different from a single asset market. In
particular, the market risk premium can increase and the risk-free rate can decrease
significantly even when the market is optimistic and confident.
JEL Classification: G12, D84.
Keywords: equilibrium asset pricing; heterogeneous beliefs; disagreement;
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3I. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing literature on the behaviour of asset prices under heterogeneous
beliefs. Some focus on the aggregation of beliefs and the structure of asset prices
under heterogeneous beliefs1; others on resolving the equity premium and the risk-free
rate puzzles (posed by Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Weil (1989)), explaining the
excess volatility puzzle, term structure of interest rates, trading volume of stocks and
options, market over(under)-reaction and momentum, and the survival of the irrational
agents2. Most of this literature views the aggregate market as a single risky asset. It
is found that heterogeneous beliefs can lead to pessimism and doubt at the market
aggregate level, which in turn help to explain high risk premium and low risk-free rate
observed in historical data. In this paper, we show that the impact of heterogeneous
beliefs in a market with multi-risky assets can be very different from a market with a
single risky asset. In particular, there can be a significant increase in the market risk
premium and a decrease in the risk-free rate even when the market is over-optimistic
and over-confident.
When agents agree to disagree, they may differ in their (subjective) beliefs about
the distribution of asset returns. When the subjective beliefs are independent across
agents, the heterogeneity in beliefs should cancel out in aggregation and hence have
no impact on the market equilibrium. This argument is intuitively appealing. However,
in a simple mean-variance framework, Fama and French (2007) show that the effect
of heterogeneity in beliefs only cancels out if the mis-informed investors on aggregate
hold the market portfolio. Otherwise, there can be a large pricing effect. This is also
the case when investors’ demands are nonlinear functions of their beliefs, as shown
in Yan (2010). Duchin and Levy (2010) also show that agents’ demand functions
are nonlinear in beliefs of variances of asset returns and the disagreement about the
variance can provide a potential explanation for the excess volatility puzzle. When
agents on average have the correct belief about the expected growth rate of aggregate
endowment, Jouini and Napp (2011) show the existence of waves of pessimism and
optimism which in turn lead to countercyclical market prices of risk and a procyclical
risk-free rate observed in financial markets.
When the effect of heterogeneity in beliefs does not cancel out, it can have a sig-
nificant impact on the equity risk premium and the risk-free rate, and the impact on a
1See, for example, Lintner (1969), Rubinstein (1974, 1975), Detemple and Murthy (1994), Jouini and
Napp (2006, 2007) and Chiarella, Dieci and He (2010, 2011).
2See, for example, Zapatero (1998), Basak (2000, 2005), Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006), Blume and Easley
(2006) and Kogan, Ross, Wang and Westerfield (2006), Li (2007), Hong and Stein (2007), David (2008),
Dumas, Kurshev and Uppal (2009), Berraday (2009), Cao and Ou-Yang (2009), and Xiong and Yan
(2010).
4multi-asset market can be very different from a single-asset market. When the aggre-
gate market is treated as a single risky asset, Abel (2002) shows that there is an increase
in the risky premium and a reduction in the risk-free rate if the representative investor
is pessimistic and doubtful about the future returns of the market3. Jouini and Napp
(2006) further show that a positive correlation between risk tolerance and pessimism
(doubt)4 can generate pessimism (doubt) at the aggregate level, leading to higher eq-
uity risk premium and lower risk-free rate in compare with a benchmark economy with
a homogeneous belief.
In a market of many risky assets, agents may disagree about the joint probability
distributions of the risky assets, which can change the market portfolio significantly.
Consequently, a multi-asset market can have very different characteristics in compare
with the market of single risky asset. However, when the number of risky assets in-
creases in the market, so does the dimension of heterogeneity in beliefs, which compli-
cates the analysis. This paper contributes to the literature by considering a market with
multi-risky assets and a risk-free asset. Agents are heterogeneous in their beliefs of
the expected returns, variances, and covariance of asset returns, including the hetero-
geneity in beliefs about the correlation between asset returns (which does not exist in a
market with a single risky asset). Within a mean-variance framework, a CAPM can be
derived under a consensus belief constructed from the heterogeneous beliefs. To ex-
amine the effect of heterogeneity on the market equilibrium, in particular, on the risk
premium and the risk-free rate explicitly, we consider a market with two risky assets
and two agents whose beliefs are mean preserving spreads (MPS) of the benchmark
homogeneous and objective belief. With the MPS, agents perceive the objective ex-
pected returns, variances and correlation on average. However, when different aspects
of the disagreement are correlated, we show that the effect of the disagreement does
not cancel out. Different from the market with single risky asset, there is a spill-over
effect, meaning that the dispersion in beliefs about one asset can affect the consensus
belief of both risky assets. Furthermore, when the heterogeneity affects the composi-
tion of the market portfolio, the multiple risky assets cannot be considered as a whole
through the market portfolio. Therefore, the intuitions from the market with a single
risky asset may not carry over to a market with multiple risky assets. In particular, a
positive correlation between risk tolerance and pessimism/doubt is no longer neces-
sary to generate a high market risk premium and a low risk-free rate. In some cases,
3When the distributions of returns are normal, being pessimistic means perceiving a lower expected
return than the one under the objective belief, and being doubtful means perceiving a larger standard
deviation of returns than the one under the objective belief.
4Meaning that more risk tolerant agents perceive low expected returns (are more doubtful).
5a positive correlation between the optimism and the belief about the correlation be-
tween asset returns dramatically increases the market risk premium and decreases the
risk-free rate.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II, market equilibrium is characterized
by a CAPM under the consensus belief. Section III examines the impact of hetero-
geneity on the consensus belief, and Section IV analyzes the effect on the market risk
premium and the risk-free rate. The paper concludes in Section V.
II. MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS
In this section, we first set up a stylized two-date economy with heterogeneous be-
liefs and multiple risky assets. Market equilibrium is then characterized by CAPM
under the consensus belief. To examine the effect of the heterogeneity in beliefs and
risk tolerances, we also introduce a benchmark economy with a homogenous belief.
A. An Economy under Heterogeneous Beliefs. Consider a two-date economy con-
sisting of K risky assets, indexed by k = 1, , 2, · · · , K, and a riskless asset. The
return of asset k is denoted by rk, return of the riskless asset is denoted by rf . The
returns of the risky assets are multivariate normal. There are N agents, indexed by i =
1, 2, · · · , N , who have heterogeneous beliefs about the expected returns and the covari-
ance matrix. Agent i’s subjective beliefs about the expected returns and the covariance
matrix are given by a vector µi = (µi,1, µi,2, · · · , µi,K)T and Σi = (ρi,jkσi,jσi,k)K×K ,
respectively, where µi,k = Ei[rk], σ2i,k = V ari[rk] and ρi,jk = Correli[rj, rk]. We use
Bi := (µi,Σi) to denote the subjective belief of agent i.
Let Wi,0 be the initial wealth of agent i, pii = (pii,1, pii,2, · · · , pii,K)T be the vec-
tor of dollar amount agent i invested in the risky assets, r = (r1, r2, · · · , rK)T and
1 = (1, 1, · · · , 1)T . Then the terminal wealth of agent i is given by Wi = Wi,0(1 +
rf ) +pi
T
i (r− rf1). Assume that agent i maximizes an expected constant absolute risk
aversion (CARA) utility function of the terminal wealth under his subjective belief,
that is, Ei[Ui(Wi)] = Ei[− exp{−Wi/τi}], where τi is the risk-tolerance of agent i.
Then the optimal portfolio of agent i is given by pi∗i = τiΣ
−1
i (µi − rf1).
B. Consensus Belief and Market Equilibrium. To characterize market equilibrium,
we construct a consensus belief (as in Lintner (1969), Rubinstein (1974,1975) and
Chiarella, Dieci and He (2011)) to describe market equilibrium. A beliefBa = (µa,Σa)
is called a market consensus belief if the equilibrium prices of the risky assets and the
risk-free rate under the heterogeneous beliefs Bi (i = 1, 2, · · · , N) are also those under
the homogeneous belief Ba. Intuitively, the consensus belief reflects how the market
as a whole perceives the expected returns and the covariance matrix of returns when
market is in equilibrium.












i = pim, where pim denotes the market portfolio weights (proportions of
initial wealth of the market invested in risky assets)5. Applying Proposition 1 and
Corollary 2 in Chiarella, Dieci and He (2010), the consensus belief Ba of the market






















where τa := 1N
∑N
i=1 τi is the average risk tolerance of the agents. The consensus
belief, in terms of the precision matrix (inverse of the covariance) is a risk tolerance
wighted average of agents’ subjective beliefs, and in terms of expected returns is a
risk tolerance/precision matrix wighted average of the subjective beliefs. Under the
consensus belief, the market portfolio in equilibrium is given by
pim = τaΣ
−1
a (µa − rf1). (2)
Furthermore, the CAPM
Ea(r)− rf1 = β[Ea(rm)− rf ] (3)
holds under the consensus belief with β = Σapim/(piTmΣapim).
The market risk premium and the risk-free rate are endogenously determined by the
consensus belief. In equilibrium, the riskless asset is in zero net supply, which implies
that the portfolio weights of the market portfolio must sum up to one, piTm1 = 1.
Hence, the equilibrium risk-free rate can be determined by
rf = (1
TΣ−1a µa − 1/τa)/1TΣ−1a 1. (4)
It follows from equation (2) that the market risk premium under the consensus belief
is given by
Ea[rm − rf ] = 1
τa
σ2a[rm], (5)
where Ea[rm] = piTmµa and σ2a[rm] = piTmΣapim are the expected return and the vari-
ance of the market portfolio under the consensus belief.
5The market clearing condition simply says that the market capitalization of each risky asset must equal
to the total wealth invested in the asset. The portfolio weights of the market portfolio pim is endoge-
nously determined in our model since it is determined by the heterogeneous beliefs of the agents. If one





i = zm, where P0 is a diagonal matrix of equilibrium prices for risky
assets. From this condition, one can compute the equilibrium asset prices.
7C. A Benchmark Economy. To examine the impact of heterogeneity, we introduce a
benchmark economy in which all agents have the same risk tolerance τ and homoge-
neous belief Bo := (µo,Σo), where µo = (µ1, µ2, · · · , µK)T and Σo = (ρjkσjσk)K×K
with µk = E[rk], σ2k = V ar[rk] and ρjk = Correl[rj, rk]. The homogeneous belief
held by all the agents is referred to as the objective belief, which can be thought of
as the hypothetical “true belief” about the expected returns and the covariance ma-
trix. In the benchmark economy, the weights of the market portfolio are given by
pˆim = τΣ
−1
o (µo − rˆf ) with the return rˆm = pˆiTmr. The risk-free rate rˆf is obtained by
replacing Σa and µa by Σo and µo respectively in equation (4) and consequently the
market risk premium is given by
E[rˆm − rˆf ] = 1
τ
σ2[rˆm]. (6)
Equation (6) shows that, under the homogeneous belief, the market risk premium is
completely characterized by the variance of the market portfolio and the risk toler-
ance. Since the consensus belief coincides with the objective belief, the market risk
premiums under the consensus belief and the objective belief are the same.
III. THE EFFECT OF DISAGREEMENT
To examine the effect of heterogeneity in a multi-asset market, we consider an econ-
omy with two risky assets and two agents with different risk tolerances and heteroge-
neous subjective beliefs about the expected returns, standard deviations and the cor-
relation coefficient. We characterize agents’ risk tolerances and subjective beliefs as
mean preserving spreads (MPS) of the average risk tolerance and the objective belief.
We show that the impact of disagreement in general does not cancel out. Moreover,
heterogeneity in beliefs and risk tolerances can have very different impact on market
equilibrium in compare with a market with a single risky asset.
A. Belief Structure – Mean-Preserving Spreads. To examine whether the effect of
heterogeneity cancels out, we assume that on average, the level of risk tolerance and
subjective belief in the economy are the same as in the benchmark economy. More
precisely, we assume the risk tolerances of the two agents are given by
τ1 = τ(1− ετ ), τ2 = τ(1 + ετ ). (7)
The difference in risk tolerances is measured by ετ . When ετ > (<)0, agent 1 is less
(more) risk tolerant than agent 2. Moreover, for each asset k = 1, 2, the subjective
8beliefs of the two agents are given by
µ1,k = µk − εµ,kσk, µ2,k = µk + εµ,kσk;
σ1,k = σk(1− εσ,k), σ2,k = σk(1 + εσ,k), (8)
ρ1 = ρ(1− ερ), ρ2 = ρ(1 + ερ).
In equation (8), εµ,k, εσ,k and ερ measure the differences in agents’ perceived expected
returns (µi,k), variances of returns (σi,k), and correlation coefficients (ρi), respectively.
When εµ,k > (<)0, agent 1 is relatively pessimistic (optimistic) about the return of
asset k than agent 2; when εσ,k > (<)0, agent 1 is relatively confident (doubtful) about
the return of asset k than agent 2; when ερ > (<)0, agent 1 perceives a lower (higher)
correlation between asset returns than agent 2.
B. Impact on the Consensus Belief. When the consensus belief coincides with the
objective belief, the effect of heterogeneity in beliefs and risk tolerances cancels out.
However, in the following propositions, we show that the effect of heterogeneity only
cancels out in very special cases. In general the heterogeneity can have significant
impact on the consensus belief and the impact can be very different in a market with
two risky assets in compare with a market with a single risky asset6.
Proposition 1. When agents are optimistic/pessimistic about the asset returns and
have different risk tolerances (so that εµ,k, ετ ∈ (−1, 1) and εσ,k = ερ = 0 in (8)), the
consensus belief is given by
Σa = Σo, µa = (µ1 + θ1, µ2 + θ2)
T , (9)
where θk = σkεµ,kετ for k = 1, 2.
Proposition 1 shows that, when beliefs are homogeneous about the covariance ma-
trix, the market perceives the objective covariance matrix Σo. The market also per-
ceives the objective expected returns µo when agents have the same levels of risk
tolerance (so that τ = 0). However, when risk tolerances differ, the market becomes
over-optimistic (over-pessimistic) if the risk tolerance and optimism (pessimism) are
positively correlated meaning that the more risk tolerant agent is more optimistic (pes-
simistic) than the less risk tolerant agent. Intuitively, the more risk tolerant agent has
a stronger incentive to buy/sell the risky assets, therefore his belief about the expected
returns has a larger weight in determining the consensus belief.
Proposition 2. When agents are optimistic/pessimistic and confident/doubtful about
asset returns (so that εµ,k, εσ,k ∈ (−1, 1) and ερ = ετ = 0 in (8)), the consensus belief
6The proofs of all the propositions follow from the consensus belief and hence are omitted.
9satisfies
(µ1 − µa,1)/σ1 = ω1(εσ,1εµ,1) + ω2(εσ,2εµ,2),




1 + ε2σ,1 − ρ2
, ω2 =
ρ








2, ρa = γρρ, (11)
and
γ1 =
(1− ε2σ,1)2(1 + ε2σ,2)(1− ρ2)
(1− ρ2)(1 + εσ,1εσ,2)2 + (εσ,1 − εσ,2)2 ,
γ2 =
(1− ε2σ,2)2(1 + ε2σ,1)(1− ρ2)
(1− ρ2)(1 + εσ,1εσ,2)2 + (εσ,1 − εσ,2)2 ,
γρ =
1 + εσ,1εσ,2√




Proposition 2 shows that the difference between the consensus and objective beliefs
about the expected return of each asset is a weighted average of the covariance between
pessimism and confidence measured by εσ,kεµ,k. When pessimism and confidence are
positive (negatively) correlated, that is εσ,kεµ,k > (<)0, the market is more likely to
be over-pessimistic (optimistic) about the return of asset k. This is intuitive, since
the confident agent is more willing to trade in the risky asset, therefore the market
should reflect more of his subjective belief about the expected asset return. However,
different from a market with a single risky asset, equation (10) shows that, for ex-
ample, even if agents agree on the expected return of asset 1 (so that µ,1 = 0), a
positive correlation between pessimism and confidence about the return of asset 2 (so
that εσ,2εµ,2 > 0) can lead the market to be over-pessimistic for both assets (so that
µa,k < µk(k = 1, 2)) when there is a positive correlation between asset returns (ρ > 0),
but be over-optimistic for asset 1 and over-pessimistic for asset 2 when there is a neg-
ative correlation (ρ > 0). Similarly, equation (11) shows that, for example, even if
agents agree on the standard deviation of asset 1 (so that σ,1 = 0), the market can still
be over-confident, that is σa,k < σk(k = 1, 2) when agents perceive different standard
deviations of asset 2. Furthermore, agents in general do not perceive the objective cor-
relation coefficient, that is ρa 6= ρ when agents have different levels of disagreement
about the standard deviations of assets 1 and 2. Note that ρa = ρ only when εσ,1 = εσ,2.
This type of spill-over effect, the fact that disagreement about the expected return and
the standard deviation of one asset can also affect the consensus belief about the entire
joint distribution of both assets, disappears when the asset returns are uncorrelated.
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Intuitively, when ρ = 0, agent i’s demand for asset 1 only depends on his perceived
expected return and the variance of asset 1, that is pii,1 = τ(µi,1 − rf )/σ2i,1. Therefore,
when both agents perceive the objective expected return and variance for asset 1, so
does the market under the consensus belief. However, when ρ 6= 0, due to the hedging
demand, agent i’s demand for asset 1 also depends on his perceived expected return
and standard deviation of asset 2, that is
pii,1 =






µi,1 − rf )
σ2i,1






Therefore the spill-over effect is due to the hedging demand7.
Proposition 3. When agents are optimistic/pessimistic about asset returns and have
different beliefs about the correlation coefficient (so that εµ,k, ερ ∈ (−1, 1) and εσ,k =









































1− ρ2(1 + ε2ρ)
]
ρ. (13)
Proposition 3 shows the joint impact of the optimism/pessimism and the dispersion
in beliefs about the correlation coefficient. Equation (12) shows that a positive corre-
lation between the optimism and the perceived correlation coefficient for asset 1 (such
that ερεµ,1 > 0) leads over-optimism for the return of asset 1 and over-pessimism for
the return of asset 2. There is also a similar spill-over effect when ερεµ,2 > 0. In
equation (13), the difference in the perceived correlation coefficients leads to an over-
confidence in the consensus belief (σa,k < σk for k = 1, 2) and a higher correlation
coefficient (ρa > ρ). Intuitively, in this case, the spill-over effect is due to the hedging
demand of the agent who perceives a higher correlation between asset returns since
he would trade more aggressively than the agent who perceives a lower correlation
coefficient. The spill-over disappears when ρ = 0 since there is no more hedging
demand.
In summary, when the heterogeneity in agents’ beliefs and the risk tolerances are
MPS of the benchmark belief, there can be significant differences between the consen-
sus and the objective beliefs. In particular, we find that when the optimism/pessimism
is correlated with the confidence/doubt or the perceived correlation coefficients, there
is a spill-over effect, that is, the disagreements about the expected return and standard
7We would like to thank the referee for pointing this out.
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deviation of one asset affect the consensus belief about the entire joint distribution of
both assets. The spill-over effect is due to the hedging demand of the over-confident
agent or the agent who perceives a higher correlation between the asset returns.
IV. IMPACT ON THE MARKET RISK PREMIUM AND THE RISK-FREE RATE
Following Abel (2002), we differentiate between two measures of the market risk
premium. The first measure E[rm − rf ] is the expected risk premium of the market
portfolio under the objective belief. The second measure Ea[rm − rf ] is the expected
risk premium perceived under the consensus belief. We refer to the first measure as
the objective risk premium and the second measure as the consensus risk premium
respectively. These two measures are generally different. To illustrate the difference
between the two measures, we introduce the following decompositions,
















∆V + ∆R. (16)
In equations (14) – (16), P = E[rm] − Ea[rm] and D = σ2a[rm] − σ2[rm] measure the
amount of pessimism and doubt in the consensus belief about the return of the market
portfolio. The terms ∆V = σ2[rm] − σ2[rˆm] and ∆R = E[rm] − E[rˆm] measure the
increase in the variance and expected return of the market portfolio under the objective
belief due to the changes in market portfolio weights. Equation (14) shows that the
objective risk premium increases with pessimism and doubt in the consensus belief,
and also increases with market variance; while equation (15) shows that the consensus
risk premium is not affected by pessimism. Intuitively, when the market is pessimistic
about the asset returns, there is a greater demand for the risk-free asset, which reduces
the risk-free rate and increases the market risk premium. However, it also means that
the market expects a lower return from the market portfolio, which cancels out with the
positive effect from the reduction of the risk-free rate. Therefore, although pessimism
increases the objective risk premium, it does not affect the consensus risk premium.
This result is also obtained in Abel (2002). Equation (16) shows that the risk-free
rate decreases with the pessimism and doubt in the consensus belief, it also decreases
with the market variance, but increases with the expected market return. When the
market portfolio under the consensus belief is the same as the one under the objective
belief, that is pim = pˆim, the changes in the market variance ∆V and the expected
return ∆R are both zero. In particular, this would be the case for the economy with
single risky asset, in which pim = pˆim = 1. In this case, the objective risk premium
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E[rm − rf ] increases and the risk-free rate decreases when the market is pessimistic
and doubtful, as in Abel (2002) and Jouini and Napp (2006). In addition, consistent
with Abel (2002), the consensus risk premium Ea[rm − rf ] increases only with doubt,
but not pessimism.
To understand the difference in the impact of heterogeneity on the market risk pre-
mium and the risk-free rate between a market with two risky assets and a market with a
single risky asset, we consider two different scenarios. One is when the market portfo-
lio remains the same as in the benchmark economy, and the other scenario is when the
market portfolio is different from the one under the benchmark economy,a more gen-
eral case. When the agents with different risk tolerances are optimismist/pessismistic,
we are able to analyze the changes in the market risk premium and the risk-free rate
explicitly in the following proposition. For other cases when the risk tolerance, opti-
mism/pessism and dobut/confidence are correlated, due to complexity, the impact of
heterogeneity is analyzed through numerical examples.
Proposition 4. When agents with different risk tolerances are optimistic/pessimistic
about asset returns (so that εµ,k, ετ ∈ (−1, 1) and εσ,k = ερ = 0 in (8)),
(i) the change in the weights of the market portfolio is given by
pim − pˆim = τ
σ21 − 2ρσ1σ2 + σ22
(
θ1 − θ2, θ2 − θ1
)T
; (17)
(ii) the change in the risk-free rate is given by
rf − rˆf = θ1(σ
2
2 − ρσ1σ2) + θ2(σ21 − ρσ1σ2)
σ21 − 2ρσ1σ2 + σ22
; (18)
(iii) the change in the objective risk premium is given by
E[rm − rf ]− E[rˆm − rˆf ] = (rˆf − rf ) + τ(θ1 − θ2)(µ1 − µ2)
σ21 − 2ρσ1σ2 + σ22
; (19)
and the change in the consensus risk premium is given by
Ea[rm − rf ]− E[rˆm − rˆf ] = τ(θ1 − θ2)(θ1 − θ2 + 2(µ1 − µ2))
σ21 − 2ρσ1σ2 + σ22
. (20)
Parameters θ1 and θ2 defined in Proposition 1 can be used to measure the covariances
between the risk tolerance and the optimism/pessimism. When the covariances are the
same so that θ1 = θ2 = θ, equation (17) shows that the market portfolio remains the
same as in the benchmark economy. In general, the market portfolio changes and the
pessimism and doubt are no longer necessary to characterize the changes in the market
risk premium and the risk-free rate.
A. Effect of Pessimism and Doubt. We first consider the case where the market
portfolio remains the same as in the benchmark economy. In this scenario, the market
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expected return and variance under the objective belief are the same as in the bench-
mark economy. Therefore, the only way that the market risk premium and the risk-free
rate can be affected by the heterogeneity in beliefs and risk tolerances is through the
pessimism and doubt. More precisely, the objective risk premium, E[rm−ff ] increases
and the risk-free rate decreases when the consensus belief about the return of the mar-
ket portfolio is pessimistic and doubtful. The consensus risk premium Ea[rm − rf ]
only increases with doubt.
When the risk tolerance and the optimism/pessimism are correlated and θ1 = θ2 =
θ, Proposition 4 shows that the optimism/pessimism has no effect on the market port-
folio. Intuitively, the consensus belief has the same amount of optimism/pessimism
about the return of each asset. Hence, as indicated by Proposition 1, the market port-
folio does not change. Also, we have from equations (18) and (19) that
E[rm − rf ]− E[rˆm − rˆf ] = −θ, rf − rˆf = θ.
This result and its intuition are consistent with Jouini and Napp (2006) for a market
with a single risky asset. That is, a positive correlation between risk tolerance and pes-
simism (so that θ < 0) makes the market over-pessimistic, leading to an increase in the
market risk premium and a decrease in the risk-free rate. Since there is no change in the
market portfolio, there is no change in the market variance and expected return. Hence
both ∆V and ∆R are equal to zero in equations (14) and (16). Therefore, only the pes-
simism P = −θ affects the market risk premium and the risk-free rate.8 Furthermore,
under the consensus belief, the reduction in the risk-free rate is cancelled out by the
fact that the market expects lower returns for risky assets. Hence the consensus risk
premium is always the same as in the benchmark economy Ea[rm− rf ] = E[rˆm− rˆf ].
To illustrate the impact, we conduct some numerical examples. As a benchmark,
let the two risky assets in the economy have expected returns (µ1, µ2) = (0.06, 0.09),
standard deviations (σ1, σ2) = (0.08, 0.3), and correlation coefficient ρ = 0.8. Both
agents hold the objective belief about asset returns, that is, Bi = Bo = (Σ,µ) for i =
1, 2. Agents have the same level of risk tolerance given by τ = 0.5. From equations
(2) and (6), the market portfolio is given by pˆim = (0.962, 0.038)T , the risk-free rate
and the market risk premium are given by rˆf = 4.62% and Eˆ(rm − rf ) = 1.49%
respectively, see Tab. 1 Case BM.
For Cases 1 and 2 in Tab. 1, we introduces heterogeneity in beliefs and risk toler-
ance proportionally for each risky asset such that their weights in the market portfolio
remain the same as in the benchmark economy. In Case 1, the more risk tolerant agent
8The pessimism P measures the average pessimism across assets weighted by their weights in the
market portfolio. However, since the amount of optimism/pessimism is the same for each asset, θ1 =
θ2 = θ, the average pessimism is simply given by −θ.
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BM Case 1 Case 2
E[rm − rf ] 1.49% 3.49% 2.87%
Ea[rm − rf ] 1.49% 1.49% 1.32%
rf 4.62% 2.62% 3.24%
P 0.00% 2.00% 1.55%
D 0.00% 0.00% −0.08%
pim,2 0.038 0.038 0.038
∆V 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
∆R 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
TABLE 1. The effects of heterogeneity on the objective risk premium E[rm−
rf ], consensus risk premium Ea[rm − rf ], risk-free rate rf , pessimism pre-
mium P , doubt premium D, market portfolio pim, changes in market variance
∆V and expected market return ∆R. .
is relatively more pessimistic than the less risk tolerant agent. More precisely, we set
ετ = −0.5, εµ,1 = 0.5 and εµ,2 = 0.1333. As a result, the amount of pessimism
is the same for each asset, that is P = θ1 = θ2 = 0.02. Results in Tab. 1 Case 1
show that consistent with the analytical results in Proposition 4, the objective risk pre-
mium increases and the risk-free rate decreases by the same amount of the pessimism
P = 2%, however the consensus risk premium is unchanged. In Case 2, the confident
agent is relatively more pessimistic than the doubtful agent. We set the parameters
εσ,k = 0.2 for k = 1, 2 and εµ,1 = 0.5 and εµ,2 = 0.1629 such that the market port-
folio remains unchanged. Results in Tab. 1 Case 2 show that a positive correlation
between confidence and pessimism leads to over-pessimism in the consensus belief
(P = 1.55%), which has a positive effect on the objective risk premium. However,
dispersion in the perceived standard deviations of returns leads to over-confidence in
the consensus belief (D = −0.08%), reducing both the objective and consensus risk
premia. As a result, the objective risk premium only increases by 1.38%, which is less
compared to Case 1, and the consensus risk premium is even lower than the benchmark
risk premium. The risk-free rate is also reduced by 1.38%, which is consistent with the
decomposition in equations (14) and (16). We have also considered the case in which
the more risk tolerant agent is relatively more doubtful than the less risk tolerant agent.
When the market portfolio remains the same as in the benchmark economy, we find
that a positive correlation between the risk tolerance and the doubt leads to a positive
doubt premium in both the objective and consensus risk premia, which is consistent
with Jouini and Napp (2006). However, the increase in the market risk premium is
very small compared to the two cases analyzed in Tab. 1.
In summary, when the heterogeneity in beliefs and risk tolerances does not affect the
market portfolio, the two risky assets can be considered as a whole through the market
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portfolio. Then the dispersion in the beliefs and the difference in the risk tolerances
affect the market risk premium and the risk-free rate only through pessimism and doubt
in the consensus belief. Both theoretical and numerical results show consistency with
the intuitions from a market with a single risky asset. Numerically, we show that a
positive correlation between the risk tolerance and the pessimism is the most promising
in generating a high objective risk premium and a lower risk-free rate compared to the
benchmark economy. However, the consensus risk premium is always the same as the
benchmark risk premium.
B. Effect of Changes in the Market Portfolio. When the market portfolio under the
consensus belief is different from the one under the benchmark economy, pessimism
and doubt are no longer necessary to characterize changes in the market risk premium
and the risk-free rate. Moreover, some of the results and intuitions for the market
with one risky asset may not necessarily carry over to a market with two risky as-
sets. For example, in Case 1, it follows from Proposition 4 that, when θ1 6= θ2, it
is not necessarily true that only a positive correlation between the risk tolerance and
pessimism can increase the objective risk premium and reduce the risk-free rate. In
fact, we observe from equations (18) and (19) that even when risk tolerance and op-
timism are positively correlated (so that θk > 0 for k = 1, 2), the risk-free rate is
reduced when θ1(σ22 − ρσ1σ2) + θ2(σ21 − ρσ1σ2) < 1. For example, if returns are
positively correlated and the return of asset 2 is much more volatile than the return
of asset 1, such that σ1 < ρσ2 (which implies σ2 > ρσ1), then a positive correla-
tion between the risk tolerance and optimism leads to a reduction in the risk-free rate
if θ1/θ2 < σ1(ρσ2 − σ1)/(σ2(σ2 − ρσ1)) < 1. Intuitively, when the market is over-
optimistic about asset returns, the proportion of asset 2 in the market portfolio increases
when θ1 < θ2, leading to a higher market variance since asset 2 is more volatile. An
increase in the market variance produces a positive ∆V , which increases the market
risk premium and reduces the risk-free rate, following equations (14), (15) and (16).
Furthermore, when assets have the same expected returns µ1 = µ2, equation (19)
shows that the increase in the objective risk premium is exactly equal to the reduction
in the risk-free rate, that is E[rm − rf ] − E[rˆm − rˆf ] = rˆf − rf . Intuitively, when
the expected returns are the same, the heterogeneity cannot affect the market expected
return through its impact on the market portfolio. Thus, from equations (14) and (16),
the change in the market expected return is always zero, that is ∆R = 0. When µ1 6=
µ2, equation (19) shows that the increase in objective risk premium may not be the
same as the reduction in the risk-free rate, the additional term depends on the product
(θ1 − θ2)(µ1 − µ2). When this product is positive (negative), we have ∆R > (<)0,
which implies E[rm − rf ] − E[rˆm − rˆf ] > (<)rˆf − rf . Intuitively, the proportion
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of asset 2 increases in the market portfolio when θ1 < θ2. If asset 2 has a relatively
higher (lower) expected return µ2 > (<)µ1, then the expected market return increases
(decreases), meaning ∆R > (<)0.
BM Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
E[rm − rf ] 1.49% 4.49% 4.00% 6.09%
Ea[rm − rf ] 1.49% 9.51% 7.60% 7.76%
rf 4.62% 3.46% 3.81% 1.64%
P 0.00% −5.02% −3.60% −1.67%
D 0.00% 0.00% −0.49% −0.15%
pim,2 0.038 0.65 0.602 0.575
∆V 0.00% 4.01% 3.54% 3.29%
∆R 0.00% 1.84% 1.69% 1.62%
TABLE 2. The effects of heterogeneity on the objective risk premium E[rm−
rf ], consensus risk premium Ea[rm − rf ], risk-free rate rf , pessimism pre-
mium P , doubt premium D, the market portfolio pim, changes in market vari-
ance ∆V and expected market return ∆R. .
To examine the impact of heterogeneity in beliefs and risk tolerance on the market
equilibrium, we consider three cases and compare the market risk premium and the
risk-free rate with those under the benchmark economy (Case BM). Numerical results
are provided in Tab. 2. In Case 1, we assume a positive correlation between risk
tolerance and optimism (so that ετεµ,k > 0 for k = 1, 2). More specifically, we
set ετ = 0.5, εµ,1 = 0.1 and εµ,2 = 0.5 respectively such that θ1 < θ2. Results
in Case 1 of Tab. 2 show that the objective risk premium increases by 3.00% while
the risk-free rate is reduced by 1.16%. The increase in the market variance contributes
∆V/τa = 8.02% to E[rm−rf ]−E[rˆm− rˆf ] and rˆf−rf , which is offseted by a negative
pessimism premium of P = −5.02% due to market’s over-optimism. Also, consistent
with the analytical result in Proposition 4, the increase in the objective risk premium
is larger than the reduction in risk-free rate. In Case 2, we assume that there is a
positive correlation between the confidence and optimism. More precisely, we assume
εσ,k = −0.2 for k = 1, 2, εµ,1 = 0.1 and εµ,2 = 0.5 such that the market is over-
optimistic about asset returns and the over-optimism is stronger for asset 2 than for
asset 1 (−εσ,1εµ,1 < −εσ,2εµ,2). In this case, the market variance increases (∆V > 0)
due to the increase in market’s holding of asset 2, which contributes ∆V/τa = 7.08%
to E[rm − rf ] − E[rˆm − rˆf ] and rˆf − rf . However, this is offseted by the negative
pessimism premium of P = −3.60% and the negative doubt premium of D/τa =
−0.98% due to the over-optimism and over-confidence in the consensus belief. As a
result, the objective risk premium increases by 2.50% while the risk-free rate reduces
by only 0.81%.
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In Case 3, we assume a positive correlation between the optimism and the per-
ceived correlation coefficients. In other words, the optimistic agent perceives a higher
correlation between asset returns than the pessimistic agent. More precisely, we set
εµ,1 = 0.1, εµ,2 = 0.5 and ερ = 0.2. This leads to an increase in the market variance
and contributes 1
τa
∆V = 6.58% to E[rm− rf ]−E[rˆm− rˆf ] and rˆf − rf . The negative
pessimism premium (P = −1.67%) is much smaller compare to Cases 1 and 2, and
the negative doubt premium (D/τa = −0.30%) is less than that in Case 2. As a result,
among all the cases considered, Case 3 provides the highest objective risk premium
(E[rm − rf ] = 6.09%) and the lowest risk-free rate (rf = 1.64%). Intuitively, from
Proposition 3, a positive correlation between the optimism and the perceived correla-
tion coefficients for asset 1 (ερεµ,1 > 0) leads to over-optimism about return of asset 1
and over-pessimism about the return of asset 2 in the consensus belief (assume ρ > 0).
Therefore the amount of over-optimism in asset 1 is offseted by the amount of over-
pessimism in asset 2. The same argument applies when there is a positive correlation
between the optimism and the perceived correlation coefficients for asset 2.
Tab. 2 shows that in all the cases considered, the consensus risk premium is higher
than the objective risk premium, that is Ea[rm− rf ] > E[rm− rf ]. This is because the
pessimism and doubt premia are either negative or zero. This suggests that in a market
with two risky assets, there can be a significant increase in the market risk premium
and reduction in the risk-free rate even when the market is over-optimistic and over-
confident (instead of being over-pessimistic and doubtful as suggested by Abel (2002)
and Jouini and Napp (2006)) about asset returns.
In summary, when the market portfolio is affected by the heterogeneity in beliefs and
risk tolerances and different from the one under the benchmark economy, the two as-
sets can no longer be considered as whole through the market portfolio. Consequently,
the intuitions from a market with a single risky asset about the way heterogeneity im-
pacts on the market risk premium and the risk-free rate may not carry over to a market
with two risky assets. In particular, we have shown that even when the market is over-
optimistic and over-confident, there can be a significant increase in the market risk
premium and reduction in the risk-free rate.
V. CONCLUSION
Heterogeneity is both ubiquitous and difficult to model in financial markets. In this
paper, we have examined the impact of disagreements among agents in a market with
two risky assets and a risk-free asset. When the subjective beliefs and risk tolerance of
the agents are characterized by MPS of a benchmark objective belief and the average
risk tolerance, we show that the impact of disagreements on the market with two risky
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assets can be very different from that with a single risky asset. First, there is a spill-over
effect in the impact of disagreement on the consensus belief, that is disagreement about
expected return and standard deviation of one asset can affect the joint distribution of
both asset in market equilibrium. Therefore, in a multi-asset market, the consensus
belief is generally different from the objective belief and effects of heterogeneity in
beliefs and risk tolerance do not cancel out in equilibrium.
We also analyze the impact of disagreement on the market risk premium and the
risk-free rate. We show that the intuitions from a market with a single risky asset carry
over to the market with two risky assets only when the market portfolio is not affected
by the heterogeneity among the agents. In this case the two assets can be considered
as whole through the market portfolio. However, in general, the heterogeneity in be-
liefs and risk tolerances does affect the market portfolio. In this case, the intuitions
from a market with a single risky asset may no longer carry over to the market with
two risky assets. We find that positive correlations between risk tolerance and opti-
mism or confidence, between confidence and optimism, and between optimism and
perceived correlation coefficients can increase the market risk premium and reduce the
risk-free rate. The positive correlation between the optimism and the perceived corre-
lation coefficients generates the most significant increase in the market risk premium
and reduction in the risk-free rate.
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